There are wide individual differences in the ability to detect a stimulus contingency embedded in a complex paradigm. The present study used a cognitive masking paradigm to better understand individual differences related to contingency learning. Participants were assessed on measures of electrodermal arousal and on working memory capacity before engaging in the contingency learning task. Contingency awareness was assessed both by trial-by-trial verbal reports obtained during the task and by a short post-task recognition questionnaire. Participants who became aware had fewer (...) non-specific skin conductance responses and tended to score higher on a digit span assessment. Skin conductance level was not significantly lower in the aware group than in the unaware group. These findings are consistent with studies showing that lower arousal and greater cognitive processing capacity facilitate conscious perception of a greater breadth of information within a scene or a task. (shrink)

This is the first good book on the early Schelling since Metzger's study in 1911. What is more, it is an entirely novel interpretation of this first and most productive decade of Schelling's philosophizing. The central thesis is that Schelling's fundamental intuition had always been that of the concrete and particular character of all reality. Reality is a whole and everything real is a whole: an actual closed totality. Even in this most Fichtean period, Schelling did not really accept the (...) transcendental position, and the philosophy of nature allowed him to expand his vision of the concrete into rich and complex constructions. This is a view which one occasionally encounters in other critical writings on Schelling, but it is usually overpowered by the accumulated Hegelian prejudice concerning Schelling's "dogmatism" and "abstract formalism." It is therefore heartening to see the author, without any polemics, challenging the Hegelians on their own favorite hunting-ground: the arid pastures of the philosophy of identity. Although the author does not fully document her findings, and although the System of Transcendental Idealism is almost totally neglected, the book is undoubtedly an important event. It may even signal the opening of new research into the early Schelling. It is immensely useful--and encouraging--for a number of scholars working on the Ages of the World and on the positive philosophy: it helps them to see the continuity in the six decades of Schelling's philosophizing.--M. J. V. (shrink)

After the post-war insistence on Schelling's middle philosophy, his late speculation is becoming again the focus of Schelling-studies--but now from a genuinely transcendental viewpoint. The origin of this shift in perspective can be traced back to W. Schulz's celebrated work on Schelling's late philosophy as the culmination of German idealism. The present study unmistakably displays the mark of Schulz's influence. Its thesis is that the early and late philosophies, are similar in that both have a double structure. In Schelling's Early (...) philosophy because the ego must represent itself at a certain stage of its development as matter, transcendental philosophy necessarily refers to the philosophy of nature. In his Late philosophy because finite knowledge has as its principle absolute freedom which manifests itself in history, negative philosophy necessarily refers to positive philosophy. Philosophy of nature and positive philosophy are privileged realms for the thinker to show the active presence of experience in reflection, i.e. to insist on the role of facticity in reason's self-founding and self-mediating enterprise. All this is presented in a clear, correct and competent way; however the style and expression are too abstract, and the reader is left with a feeling of narrow precision.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This is the first good book on the early Schelling since Metzger's study in 1911. What is more, it is an entirely novel interpretation of this first and most productive decade of Schelling's philosophizing. The central thesis is that Schelling's fundamental intuition had always been that of the concrete and particular character of all reality. Reality is a whole and everything real is a whole: an actual closed totality. Even in this most Fichtean period, Schelling did not really accept the (...) transcendental position, and the philosophy of nature allowed him to expand his vision of the concrete into rich and complex constructions. This is a view which one occasionally encounters in other critical writings on Schelling, but it is usually overpowered by the accumulated Hegelian prejudice concerning Schelling's "dogmatism" and "abstract formalism." It is therefore heartening to see the author, without any polemics, challenging the Hegelians on their own favorite hunting-ground: the arid pastures of the philosophy of identity. Although the author does not fully document her findings, and although the System of Transcendental Idealism is almost totally neglected, the book is undoubtedly an important event. It may even signal the opening of new research into the early Schelling. It is immensely useful--and encouraging--for a number of scholars working on the Ages of the World and on the positive philosophy: it helps them to see the continuity in the six decades of Schelling's philosophizing.--M. J. V. (shrink)

At the beginning of the first version of the Ages of the World Schelling invoked Plato's protection against the criticism he was expecting from his contemporaries. More than forty years later, in his last system, Aristotle had become the most quoted of his predecessors. The way from Plato to Aristotle and the parallels drawn between "the philosopher" and Kant are among the best parts of the book. Hegel is almost as much studied by Oeser as Schelling. After all, the subtitle (...) announces a contribution to the critique of the Hegelian system. Unlike most scholars of the German idealism the author does not try to play out Hegel against Schelling or Schelling against Hegel. He is more interested in showing their similarities. However, in spite of this, Oeser's sympathies obviously lie with Schelling and in the last chapter he attempts to show how the final system of Schelling, that of the "purely rational philosophy" was not written only to give a new platform to the positive philosophy but also to lay the groundwork for a reconciliation between metaphysics and dialectical idealism in terms of transcendence and transcendentality.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This excellent short book has come only belatedly to our attention. Unlike the more recent work of J. Schlanger, Meier's aim is not to revise, even less to revolutionize, our understanding of the young Schelling. He is following the classical interpretation--from Hegel to Kroner--that already the early Schelling displayed unmistakable signs of an ontological dogmatism. Indeed, with the exception of the ethical inspiration of the celebrated Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism and the gnoseological investigations of the Treatises, the early Schelling (...) is concerned with the issues of ontology--this is at least the author's thesis. The hollow majesty of the System of 1801 is foreshadowed by innumerable passages in the writings on the philosophy of nature. It is true that the System of Transcendental Idealism does display a certain parallelism between the gnoseological and ontological elements--but the balance is quickly broken. Under the appearance of the reconciliation of dogmatism and criticism in the doctrine of absolute knowledge via intellectual intuition, Schelling completes the restoration of ontology in the Bruno, in the Lectures on Academical Studies, and in the System of Würzburg. All this is expounded in clear, precise, well articulated chapters which enable the reader to attain a unified view of the central themes and inspirations of the immense literary production of the early Schelling.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Author of a short study on Franz von Baader Klaus, Hemmerle presents us now with a longer study on the last philosophy of Schelling. The book sets out to be an exercise in Mitdenken. Instead of accumulating footnotes and going through the usual painstaking ways of a scholarly exegesis of texts, Hemmerle tries to think with Schelling, along the lines of Schelling's thought; and he does this a rather original way. Motivated by a genuine enthusiasm for Schelling, Hemmerle paraphrases and (...) comments on the difficult notions of the so-often enigmatic Spätphilosophie in a freely flowing, dynamic and truly suggestive language. He manages to keep the abstractions fascinating and the difficult arguments attractive. Yet in his admiration for his chosen author he becomes somewhat less than critical, expounding the most questionable constructs of the old Schelling as self-evident products of human thinking; and he does all this without any attempt at situating the teacher of the negative and positive philosophies in the general framework of the history of philosophy--or even in that of his own previous systems. The central theme of the book is God, the God to whom philosophy cannot reach out by itself but who descends to the philosophical thinking. How this God still remains a God for philosophy is the central problem of the late Schelling. Visibly inspired by the provocative studies of W. Schulz yet displaying a real originality, this book seems to us a rather unusual contribution to the growing literature on the late Schelling.--M. J. V. (shrink)

It becomes increasingly difficult to keep up with studies of Schelling, or more generally of the history of German Idealism, without being conversant with the rapidly growing Italian literature in this field. This book appears twenty-five years after that of Horst Furrmans, and ten years after that of Walter Schulz—the two major studies to date of Schelling's later philosophy. Although Bausola's study does not display the depth and extent of scholarly penetration to be found in Furrmans or Schulz, neither does (...) it display their pretention. It does not claim to be the ultimate interpretation. Its avowed aim is to treat one major theme in the later Schelling: that of relationship between metaphysics and revelation. Yet it also points to a rather novel interpretation, or at least a sketch, of the relationship of the middle Schelling to the writings preceding the Bruno. For the non-specialist, this book is a valuable introduction, offering a clear and well written account of the great themes of Schelling's late philosophy. Included is a competent review of the relevant secondary sources and a bibliographical notice of publications after 1953, the closing date of Schneeberger's standard Schelling bibliography.—M. J. V. (shrink)

At the beginning of the first version of the Ages of the World Schelling invoked Plato's protection against the criticism he was expecting from his contemporaries. More than forty years later, in his last system, Aristotle had become the most quoted of his predecessors. The way from Plato to Aristotle and the parallels drawn between "the philosopher" and Kant are among the best parts of the book. Hegel is almost as much studied by Oeser as Schelling. After all, the subtitle (...) announces a contribution to the critique of the Hegelian system. Unlike most scholars of the German idealism the author does not try to play out Hegel against Schelling or Schelling against Hegel. He is more interested in showing their similarities. However, in spite of this, Oeser's sympathies obviously lie with Schelling and in the last chapter he attempts to show how the final system of Schelling, that of the "purely rational philosophy" was not written only to give a new platform to the positive philosophy but also to lay the groundwork for a reconciliation between metaphysics and dialectical idealism in terms of transcendence and transcendentality.--M. J. V. (shrink)

C. G. Carus was the last and perhaps—besides G. H. Schubert—the most important representative of late Romantic philosophical anthropology. The present book is a welcome reprint of his most popular writing, a fascinating, imaginative, more speculative than experimental treatise on the different psychic functions. Carus' main thesis—avowedly inspired by the Schellingian Naturphilosophie—is the living unity of the body and the soul, which is itself, however, only a superior manifestation of a life-penetrated Universe. Like the other Romantic "scientists" gravitating around Schelling, (...) Carus was entirely forgotten during the second half of the nineteenth century; but he is now being read again.—M. J. V. (shrink)

One of the forgotten "small masters" of German Romanticism is the aesthetician Solger. Besides his famous Erwin, his only major writing is the Lectures on Aesthetics. It displays a coherent and original theory of the beautiful and of art, even though a continuous polemical relationship to Schelling, Fichte and Hegel is ever present in its pages. Solger's sensitive theorizing reconciles the norms of classicism with the aims of romanticism and at the same time points beyond them towards the fundamental principles (...) and attitudes of the coming realistic aesthetic. This book is a posthumous one, based upon lectures which Solger never intended to publish. As a matter of fact, he strongly opposed the practice of printing university courses as such. Yet, these texts are perhaps most representative of the subtle and harmonious thought of this man who died at the height of his creative life. Their reprinting is an important literary event.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Appearing in English for the first time, Schelling’s 1842 lectures develop the idea that many philosophical concepts are born of religious-mythological notions.

Even though the last decade has seen more original and significant work on Fichte, the flow of studies on his rival and "successor," Schelling, seems to continue uninterrupted. Beyond so many short and often quite modest writings, Kasper's huge book is towering, and not only because of its size. Kasper, like Horst Fuhrmans to whom he seems to be the most indebted and who is not in Schelling studies, is a Roman Catholic theologian who commands an immense and impressive knowledge (...) of the history of theological speculation from the Greek Fathers to the nineteenth century school of Tübingen. Like most major studies on Schelling, the present one must struggle its way through the evolution of the many phases of his thought before getting down to the more systematic investigation. Such an endeavor must express a "preference" for one of those phases, and, as is usually the case today, the greatest appreciation is directed towards the Spätphilosophie. The core and kernel of the book is the beautiful and highly concentrated exposition on "God as the ground and the Lord of history" where historicity itself receives its ontological deduction from the premisses of theism. The book concludes with the concrete modalities of the divine mediation of history through the great issues of the fall, mythology, and revelation. For more than a decade Walter Schulz's interpretation of Schelling's late philosophy has seemed to overshadow, and to dismiss, all more Weltanschauung-orientated research. It has long been time for a study focusing on Schelling, the philosopher of Christianity, which is what Schelling considered himself to be for the last forty-five years of his life.--M. J. V. (shrink)

One of the most interesting and difficult tasks of contemporary theological reflection is the elaboration of a verifiable theology. The subject is as old as theology itself, and the contemporaries of Schleiermacher, like Hegel and Schelling, devoted immense industry and ingenuity to a speculative study of the history of religions. Yet the idealist's philosophical approach could not satisfy Schleiermacher whose very point of departure is the autonomous category of the religious. His peculiar approach to the different positive religions, their necessity (...) as well as their facticity, is the central theme of Welker's book. In a way, we are given a restatement of Schleiermacher's fundamental views on religion and religions. The treatment of the history of religion is only a corollary of these more general issues. The book is concluded with a rich and interesting chapter comparing Schleiermacher with Rudolph Otto.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This volume is the reprint of perhaps the best study of Goethe's philosophy. Its importance lies in its method. Instead of trying only to collect material pertaining to traditional, philosophical problems, it makes a deep-reaching attempt to grasp and to extricate the metaphysical foundations and basic themes of Goethe's Weltanschauung. There is a thoroughgoing analysis of his "morphological" method and excellent, long passages on his magnificent studies of the life and the structure of plants. The culmination of the whole work (...) is its third part: on the symbol considered what it truly is, not a merely esthetical [[sic]], but an essentially metaphysical notion. The book is not easy to read and it does presuppose a certain familiarity with Goethe's whole oeuvre. Those interested in the history of German idealism will certainly appreciate the parallels with Kant, but unfortunately Weinhandl omits the important parallels with Schelling.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Another volume in a rich list of publications in the history of philosophy by the University of Urbino. Although the present book is an unpretentious commentary on Schelling's Philosophy of Art, making use of a few more of his texts related to aesthetics, still it is a welcome sign of the renewal of interest in the early Schelling after three decades of research oriented almost exclusively to his middle and late periods. After a rather comprehensive treatment of the role of (...) the philosophy of art within philosophy as such, of the evolution of Schelling's aesthetics and of the relationship between beauty and truth, the author offers us his interpretation of the Philosophy of Art as a "Goethean system." An interesting appendix consists of the German text and the Italian translation of the few poems we know from Schelling.—M. J. V. (shrink)

The great value of this book does not lie in any new discovery but in its being the most comprehensive monograph to date on the major ideas of Jacobi's thinking as well as on the relationship of the "philosopher of faith" to the leading German thinkers of his time. The first chapters are devoted to a subtle analysis—focussing mainly on his novels—of the moral aspirations underlying his philosophical oeuvre. The next major theme is the well-known polemics with M. Mendelssohn on (...) Lessing's alleged Spinozism—and this is a good pretext for Prof. Verra to display his vast learning by passing in review the views of Herder, Gœthe, and Hegel on Spinoza and continuously referring to the highly important book of Heydenreich. The last three chapters deal with Jacobi's "mature" thought centered around the problem of an intuitive knowledge of reality and his violent polemics against philosophical demonstration as such, which leads necessarily—according to him—to Spinozistic pantheism, i.e., atheism. It is in these chapters that Jacobi's criticism of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling is treated. The footnotes are at the end of the chapters, and they should be read separately. They are sheer delight for anyone a little at home in this period of German intellectual history. There is also a forty page appendix: the bibliography of Jacobi's letters of which not less than 1291 are known to Prof. Verra.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Though Joseph Nadler published the definitive, critical edition of Hamanns' complete works, the hermetic character of these texts warrants only too strongly a publication of at least the major texts with commentaries. The annotated edition is planned to comprise eight volumes. From the viewpoint of the history of ideas, Vol. IV is undoubtedly the most interesting, since it contains the important texts on the origin of language. These were directly provoked by Herder's famous Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache; "the (...) Magician of the North" fights the spirit of the Aufklärung even when it is clothed in the more attractive, pre-romantic setting of Herder's prose. Besides a fantastic amount of notes and commentary, Miss Büchsel, the editor of Vol. IV, offers a comprehensive and penetrating introductory study. Especially important are the chapters on the "pre-history" of Hamanns' Herder-interpretation and its influence on the later development of German intellectual life from the early Goethe to the old Schelling Vol. V contains the so-called mystery-writings directly pertinent to the Christian doctrine of the revelation of the Incarnated Son of God. These texts are truly esoteric, and even the multitude of notes accompanying them cannot always fully overcome their terrible obscurity. And here arises the only objection against this edition. The notes and commentaries are a mine of detailed information, and they "unconceal" the meaning of every word. Yet perhaps their very abundance impedes their stated purpose. They do help in understanding the words, but they make sustained reading of the texts themselves impossible. The encyclopedical character of the notes is cause for both exasperation and for growth in knowledge and inspiration.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Hamann is one of the greatest religious writers of the eighteenth century in Germany. He is the person whom Schelling, Hegel, and Kierkegaard admired, read, and quoted. This book treats the major themes and insights of Hamann. Texts of Hamann are represented by a large number of quotations. Hamann never wrote a systematic treatise; he wrote short, devastating, illuminating essays and criticisms, as well as letters. Especially interesting are the chapters dealing with Hamann's criticism of contemporary philosophy, and his views (...) concerning the relation of philosophy and faith. This is a fine study which helps the reader to gain some orientation and perspective on Hamann's subtle and obscure writings.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This is a complicated and ingenious study of one of the famous friendships of German intellectual history. Miss Knoll's aim is not so much to analyze philosophical ideas as to find the major structural elements of this highly emotional literary friendship between Hamann and Jacobi. The book begins with a short review of Hegel's and Dilthey's treatment of the "subject," Hamann-Jacobi. The author objects to these treatments which, like practically all other students of the question viewed the letters from an (...) exclusively philosophical and speculative viewpoint, and never tackled the deeply personal structure of this metaphysical-religious correspondence. This is exactly what the present author attempts to do. The analysis of Hamann's highly complex reactions to Jacobi's famous book on Lessing's Spinozism reveals to us how strongly and on how many levels the "magician of the North" criticized Jacobi—and through him any attempt to combat the Enlightenment which does not reject it in integro. On the other hand Hamann continuously sent his manuscripts to Jacobi to be read and criticized, and, in this way, he sought to help the latter to grow by making him contribute to works of a dimension and depth completely alien to his own thought But the destiny of Hamann was to be misunderstood by Jacobi, and this misunderstanding was recognized and corrected only by Schelling. Though H. Fuhrmans has already forcefully pointed out what Schelling owed to Hamann, the present book is the first to do justice to Schelling's Hamann-interpretation, until now entirely overshadowed by that of Hegel.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Friedrich Schlegel is known above all as a man of letters and political interests, while his philosophical opus has received as yet a very limited interest and attention. Perhaps this new critical edition will enable him to carve a small niche for himself in forthcoming histories of philosophy. He was certainly not the most significant thinker; but his imagination, many-sidedness, sharpness, and his unmistakable speculative gift qualify him to be in the second rank of Romantic philosophers immediately after Schelling and (...) Baader. The young Friedrich Schlegel was thoroughly under the spell of Fichte, but his later development—notwithstanding personal antipathy—carried him close to Schelling. The ethical pathos of Fichte's doctrine could not make Schlegel overlook the injustice done to nature, art, and religion. Though his celebrated conversion to Catholicism in the Dom of Cologne did not take place until 1838, Schlegel read Jacob Boehme and was a close friend of Schleiermacher, and thus was absorbed by religious problems years before. Already in his Cologne lectures he goes beyond the vague idealistic concept of the "divinity" in favor of a personal and transcendent God. These two volumes of the critical edition contain the following texts: Transzendentalphilosophie, lectures in Jena from 1800-1801. The text is the one published by J. Körner in 1935. The Development of Philosophy in Twelve Books and Propedeutic and Logic. The texts in Propedeutic and Logic are of a general introductory character. But in The Development of Philosophy a tremendous effort is made to give, if not an entirely systematic, at least a quasi-all-embracing, encyclopedic sketch of philosophy and its history. Here again we read nothing substantially new. The editor follows the text published by Windischmann in 1836 but does complete it with variants from other manuscripts. Métaphysique. These lectures were delivered in French to Madame de Staël. In addition to an already known text published by J. Körner the editor makes use of a manuscript in the hand of Schlegel which was found only after the last war. The preface of J.-J. Anstett is ascetically short and even the commentary consists only of sober and learned notes at the end of the second volume.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This Festschrift is one of the best we have been offered during the last decade. German, French, Turkish, Italian, South African, and Austrian scholars have written 23 essays in honor of one of the foremost historians of philosophy in this century, H. Heimsoeth. Half of the book is devoted to Kantian-scholarship; especially impressive are: Guéroult's study on the structure of the second analogy of experience, Belaval's comparison between Kant and Leibniz, and the richly documented long investigation by G. Tonelli on (...) the presuppositions of Kant's table of judgments in the logic of the eighteenth century. The second part of the present volume is more heterogeneous than the first. One reads with genuine enthusiasm H. Fuhrmans' "The God-World relationship in Schelling's late philosophy." L. Landgrebe's article on the philosophical problem of the end of history is grounded in Kantian soil, but other essays are little connected to Heimsoeth's major interests. These essays include: E. Lichtenstein on the philosophical development of the concept of culture from Meister Eckhart to Hegel; F. Nicolin on the systematic situation of the history of pedagogy since Herbart and Schleiermacher; and H. Wagner's paper on Plato and the beginning of metaphysics as a science. The book concludes with a rich bibliography of Heimsoeth's publications since 1911.--M. J. V. (shrink)

After the monumental works of Xavier Leon and Martial Guéroult, the French have again produced a significant piece of Fichte-interpretation. The author advances two radically new theses: Fichte's philosophy is above all centered around the deduction of the other, and even objectivity as such is based upon inter-subjectivity. The Doctrine of Science, instead of being the foundation of an absolute idealism, teaches that the only knowledge which can be had is empirical knowledge, and all logic is rooted in time. Philonenko (...) claims that Fichte's aim was to uphold the adequacy and essential correctness of common everyday knowledge over against the pretensions of metaphysical speculation. This is a magnificent book: the product of a truly amazing scholarship in the history of philosophy, full of ingenious and highly imaginative rapprochements and insights. It is also another welcome manifestation of that recent continental trend in the interpretation of German idealism which realizes that Fichte and Schelling do not simply fill the gap between Kant and Hegel, but are great philosophers in their own right. If any objection can be made at all against the work, it would be the limitation of its argument to the first period of Fichte's creativity. The author's avowed aim is to confine himself to the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, and, as a matter of fact, we rarely find a quote later than 1798. Indeed, Fichte always claimed that no qualitative change took place in his thought. However, his exposition of it steadily altered, and in view of this, perhaps it is not entirely unjustified to regret that the Wissenschaftslehre of 1804 and the Answeisung zum seligen Leben are not taken into account in interpreting the early Fichte.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Though Joseph Nadler published the definitive, critical edition of Hamanns' complete works, the hermetic character of these texts warrants only too strongly a publication of at least the major texts with commentaries. The annotated edition is planned to comprise eight volumes. From the viewpoint of the history of ideas, Vol. IV is undoubtedly the most interesting, since it contains the important texts on the origin of language. These were directly provoked by Herder's famous Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache; "the (...) Magician of the North" fights the spirit of the Aufklärung even when it is clothed in the more attractive, pre-romantic setting of Herder's prose. Besides a fantastic amount of notes and commentary, Miss Büchsel, the editor of Vol. IV, offers a comprehensive and penetrating introductory study. Especially important are the chapters on the "pre-history" of Hamanns' Herder-interpretation and its influence on the later development of German intellectual life from the early Goethe to the old Schelling Vol. V contains the so-called mystery-writings directly pertinent to the Christian doctrine of the revelation of the Incarnated Son of God. These texts are truly esoteric, and even the multitude of notes accompanying them cannot always fully overcome their terrible obscurity. And here arises the only objection against this edition. The notes and commentaries are a mine of detailed information, and they "unconceal" the meaning of every word. Yet perhaps their very abundance impedes their stated purpose. They do help in understanding the words, but they make sustained reading of the texts themselves impossible. The encyclopedical character of the notes is cause for both exasperation and for growth in knowledge and inspiration.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Friedrich Schlegel is known above all as a man of letters and political interests, while his philosophical opus has received as yet a very limited interest and attention. Perhaps this new critical edition will enable him to carve a small niche for himself in forthcoming histories of philosophy. He was certainly not the most significant thinker; but his imagination, many-sidedness, sharpness, and his unmistakable speculative gift qualify him to be in the second rank of Romantic philosophers immediately after Schelling and (...) Baader. The young Friedrich Schlegel was thoroughly under the spell of Fichte, but his later development—notwithstanding personal antipathy—carried him close to Schelling. The ethical pathos of Fichte's doctrine could not make Schlegel overlook the injustice done to nature, art, and religion. Though his celebrated conversion to Catholicism in the Dom of Cologne did not take place until 1838, Schlegel read Jacob Boehme and was a close friend of Schleiermacher, and thus was absorbed by religious problems years before. Already in his Cologne lectures he goes beyond the vague idealistic concept of the "divinity" in favor of a personal and transcendent God. These two volumes of the critical edition contain the following texts: Transzendentalphilosophie, lectures in Jena from 1800-1801. The text is the one published by J. Körner in 1935. The Development of Philosophy in Twelve Books and Propedeutic and Logic. The texts in Propedeutic and Logic are of a general introductory character. But in The Development of Philosophy a tremendous effort is made to give, if not an entirely systematic, at least a quasi-all-embracing, encyclopedic sketch of philosophy and its history. Here again we read nothing substantially new. The editor follows the text published by Windischmann in 1836 but does complete it with variants from other manuscripts. Métaphysique. These lectures were delivered in French to Madame de Staël. In addition to an already known text published by J. Körner the editor makes use of a manuscript in the hand of Schlegel which was found only after the last war. The preface of J.-J. Anstett is ascetically short and even the commentary consists only of sober and learned notes at the end of the second volume.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This article presents Schelling’s claim that nature has an evolutionary process and Hegel’s response that nature is the development of the concept. It then examines whether evolution is progressive. While many evolutionary biologists explicitly repudiate the suggestion that there is progress in evolution, they often implicitly presuppose this. Moreover, such a notion seems required insofar as the shape of life’s history consists in a directional trend. This article argues that, insofar as a notion of progress is indeed conceptually ineliminatable from (...) evolutionary biology or needed to articulate the shape of life’s history, progress should be viewed as constitutive. The section on “Why Schelling and .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness by Robb DUNPHYJ. M. FritzmanDUNPHY, Robb. Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023. x + 213 pp. Cloth, $105.00This rich, learned, and important book investigates and critically evaluates how, according to Hegel, philosophy should begin. Briefly stated, the problem of beginning philosophy is that any beginning seems susceptible to a skeptical (...) challenge that takes the form of a dilemma. On the one side, if philosophy begins immediately with a presuppositionless assertion, skeptics will contend that it is dogmatic. On the other side, if philosophy begins mediately with a claim that presupposes an argument, skeptics will confront each premise of that argument with a trilemma: The premise is either only a dogmatic assertion; it is the conclusion of an argument whose premises must in turn be justified (which threatens an infinite regress); or it depends on an argument that is viciously circular. Hegel solves this problem with a beginning that is simultaneously immediate and mediate.The introduction explains that this book has three goals. First, it critically analyzes the problem of beginning, showing how Hegel responds to the skeptical challenge. Second, it explains how Hegel’s approach to the problem and his solution are informed by his deep engagement with the tradition of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Finally, it provides a guide to reading Hegel’s essay “With What Must the Beginning of the Science be Made?” in the Science of Logic.Chapter 1, “Hegel and Pyrrhonian Scepticism,” presents the essentials of Pyrrhonism and Hegel’s interpretation of it. Pyrrhonism is a way of life. It aims to find an equally good counterargument for every argument it encounters, thus leading to a suspension of judgment that allows the skeptic to live in a state of undisturbedness. Pyrrhonism presents encountered arguments with a trilemma: Either they depend on dogmatic assertions; they generate an infinite regress of arguments; or they are viciously circular. Hegel’s interpretation emphasizes skepticism’s equipollence, whereby it opposes every argument with a counterargument that is equally persuasive. Viewed historically, Pyrrhonism seems to have confronted arguments only as it happened to encounter them and to have restricted itself to epistemology. However, Hegel is open to the interpretation that skepticism’s inquiry could be completed. This would allow it to demonstrate that for every argument there will always be an [End Page 143] equally persuasive counterargument. He also interprets skepticism as accepting a metaphysical principle regarding the inherent instability of objects.“A Short History of the Problem of Beginning,” chapter 2, provides a detailed précis of Hegel’s essay. It also gives the brief history of the problem of beginning, discussing Descartes, Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. It notes that some philosophers posit an objective beginning, others a subjective beginning. It explains why Hegel regards previous attempts to solve the problem of beginning as inadequate. It recognizes that Fichte’s solution can be interpreted as much closer to that of Hegel than Hegel acknowledges.Chapter 3, “The Problem of Beginning,” supplies Hegel’s own account of the problem. His solution has two versions, one in the Science of Logic and the other in the Encyclopedia Logic. Each version posits a beginning without determinate content. In the Science of Logic, Hegel states that absolute knowing, the culminating shape of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, corresponds to the empty thinking with which philosophy begins. Philosophy’s beginning in the Science of Logic is mediate as it emerges from the progression of shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit and immediate as it does not have an object of thought. In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel proposes that a completed skepticism corresponds to the abstract concept of being with which philosophy begins. Philosophy’s beginning in the Encyclopedia Logic is mediate as it emerges from the skepticism’s equipollence and immediate as being without content. Hegel ultimately denies that a completed skepticism could play this role, however, which suggests that he believes that philosophy can begin immediately.“Meditation I—Phenomenology,” chapter 4, argues that Hegel’s first version is unsuccessful. To succeed, William Maker’s interpretation would have to be accepted, which... (shrink)

0 0 1 152 943 Lewis & Clark College 21 2 1093 14.0 Normal 0 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE Regarding each philosophy as a variation of that of Spinoza , t his article compares the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel with the Indian Ved ā nta of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, as well as Abhinavagupta’s Kaśmiri Śaivism. It argues that only Hegel’s philosophy does not fail. For Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, the experience of ultimate reality—Brahman for Śaṅkara (...) and Rāmānuja, Śiva for Abhinavagupta, the Absolute for Schelling—is self-authenticating and so excludes the possibility of error. However, there is also no possibility of truth as no criterion distinguishes truth from error when individuals make contradictory claims. By contrast, Hegel’s Geist is an extended mind that potentially encompasses the human community. Geist develops historically. Experience is conceptual and concepts must be socially recognized to be legitimate. Experience is fallible, for Hegel, and better accounts are obtained through mutual criticism. Although disagreement represents an impassible impasse for Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja , Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, it is the road forward for Hegel. (shrink)

Post-Kantian German idealism is an important influence on such contemporary approaches to philosophy as phenomenology, existentialism, and pragmatism, and because of this Seidel has undertaken an investigation of the related notions of activity and ground as they appear and develop in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Common to all three thinkers is an emphasis on activity as conscious, free, and functioning as the ground or source of meaning for being. Each thinker in his own way also accepts the notion of a (...) dialectical interaction between the self and the world in which subject and object reciprocally influence one another. (shrink)

O presente texto, de que se dá em seguida a tradução portuguesa, consiste numa selecção da correspondência entre F. W. J Schelling, J. C. F. Hölderlin e G. W. F. Hegel, três colegas e amigos do Stift de Tübingen, três vértices de uma das mais interessantes e importantes unidades teóricas do idealismo alemão e, por conseguinte, três elementos cujos anos de aprendizagem filosófica se revelam hoje essenciais para a boa compreensão da génese da sua época.

According to Quentin Meillassoux, one of the principal aims of speculative philosophy “must be the immanent inscription of values in being.” In this regard, the return to speculation in contemporary philosophy is in many ways a deeply ethical project. This “inscription of values” can only be successful, however, if it can somehow assert an absolute ethical value without, on the one hand, resorting to the kind of dogmatism laid to rest by the Kantian critique; or, on the other, by falling (...) into some form of ethical relativism incapable of grounding universal ethical judgments. Unfortunately, too many of these attempts have failed. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to explore the structure and failures of two such attempts through an analysis of the ethical projects of Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux, respectively; and then, secondly, to show how both of these thinkers, and the project of speculative ethics in general, could benefit by turning to the work of F.W.J. Schelling on the concept of good and evil as absolute ethical values. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The Geological Society of London was the first learned society to be devoted solely to geology, and its members were responsible for much of the spectacular progress of the science in the nineteenth century. Its distinctive character as a centre of geological discussion and research was established within the first five years from its foundation in 1807. During this period its activities were directed, and its policies largely shaped, by its President, George Bellas Greenough, on whose unpublished papers this account (...) is chiefly based.The Society began as a small scientific dining club in London, but it developed rapidly into a learned society with a nation-wide membership. It became so independent in outlook and so active in research that it was felt to threaten the esteem of the Royal Society; and little more than a year after its foundation it clashed with the Royal Society so violently that its continued existence was for a time uncertain.Its development into a large independent society was the outcome of its ‘Baconian’ view of the importance of collecting geological facts as a surer basis for geological theories. For this purpose it initiated an ambitious scheme for co-operative research, which would unite the efforts of ‘philosophers’ with those of ‘practical men’. Only personal reasons seem to have kept the most prominent of the practical men—William Smith—from co-operating with the Society. (shrink)

George Greenough was one of the influential group of early nineteenth-century English geologists who rejected both Hutton's and Werner's attempts to propound all-embracing geological theories, and followed a deliberately empirical approach. He travelled through Scotland in 1805, studying geological phenomena in the light of both the Plutonist and the Neptunist theories, and generally concluded that neither was entirely satisfactory as an explanation of the observable facts. He was also the first to suggest that the ‘Parallel Roads’ of Glen Roy were (...) the successive beach-levels of a former lake: this theory was later attacked by Darwin but ultimately vindicated by Agassiz's glacial theory. The more important geological passages from Greenough's MS. journal of the tour are reproduced and discussed in this paper. They illustrate some of the scientific problems that were involved in accepting either Hutton's or Werner's theory entire. (shrink)